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Abstract—Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain
costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes
the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet
forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and
incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation
among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based
on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to
high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only
certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches
have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this,
we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies
Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive
budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol,
which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast)
protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary
and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality
of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior
performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive
compatible broadcast protocol.
Index Terms—Ad hoc wireless networks, incentive compatible
broadcast (ICB), rationality, selfish nodes, Bayesian incentive
compatible broadcast (BIC-B), Dominant strategy incentive com-
patible broadcast (DSIC-B), least cost path (LCP), source rooted
broadcast tree (SRBT), budget balance, individual rationality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications industry is currently one of the
fastest growing industries in the world. The industry has
several segments such as cellular telephony, satellite-based
communication networks, wireless LANs, and ad hoc wireless
networks. An ad hoc wireless network is an autonomous
system of nodes connected through wireless links. It does
not have any fixed infrastructure such as base stations in
cellular networks. The nodes in the network coordinate among
themselves for communication. Hence, each node in the
network, apart from being a source or destination, is also
expected to route packets for other nodes in the network. Such
networks find varied applications in real-life environments
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such as communication in battle fields, communication among
rescue personnel in disaster affected areas, and wireless sensor
networks.
The conventional protocols for routing, multicasting, and
broadcasting in ad hoc wireless networks assume that nodes
follow the prescribed protocol without any deviation and they
cooperate with one another in performing network functions
such as packet forwarding, etc. However, in many current ap-
plications of ad hoc wireless networks, nodes are autonomous,
rational, and intelligent, and could exhibit strategic behavior.
A wireless node is autonomous because no other wireless
node may have direct control over the decisions or actions
taken by that node. A wireless node is rational in the sense of
making decisions consistently in pursuit of its own objectives.
Each node’s objective is to maximize the expected value
of individual payoff measured in some utility scale. Note
that selfishness or self-interest is an important implication of
rationality. A wireless node is intelligent in the sense that it
takes into account its knowledge or expectation of behavior
of other nodes in determining its best response actions. The
behavior exhibited by a network of rational and intelligent
nodes can be modeled in a natural way using game theory
[1]. We use the phrase selfish nodes in this paper, to refer to
rational and intelligent nodes.
There are several recent efforts exploring the use of game
theoretic models in the modeling and analysis of various
design problems in ad hoc networks at different levels of
the protocol stack [2], [3]. It has been applied at (a) the
physical layer level to analyze distributed power control [4],
[5] and waveform adaption; (b) at the data link layer level
to analyze medium access control [6] and the reservation
of bandwidth [7], [8]; and (c) at the network layer level to
model the behavior of the packet forwarding strategies [9],
[10]. Applications at the transport layer and above also exist,
although less pervasive in the literature.
A question of interest in all the situations mentioned above
is that of how to provide appropriate incentives to prevent self-
ish behavior by the nodes. Examples of selfish nodes include:
a node increasing its power without regard for interference it
may cause on its neighbors; a node immediately retransmitting
a frame in the case of a collision without waiting for the back-
off phrase; a node refusing to forward the transit packets of the
other nodes in the network, etc. Selfish behavior is generally
detrimental to the overall network performance. In this paper,
our focus is on studying the packet forwarding strategies of
selfish nodes in the specific context of broadcast.
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2A. The Incentive Compatible Broadcast (ICB) Problem
Broadcast is useful in ad hoc wireless networks in many
situations, for example, route discovery, paging a particular
host, or sending an alarm signal, etc. Successful broadcast
requires appropriate forwarding of the packet(s) by individual
wireless nodes. The nodes incur certain costs for forwarding
packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of
the nodes. If the nodes are rational, we cannot take packet
forwarding by nodes for granted. Reimbursing the forwarding
costs or transit costs incurred by the nodes is a way to make
them forward the packets. For this, we need to know the exact
transit costs at the nodes. However, the nodes may not be
willing to reveal the true transit costs. Broadcast protocols
that induce revelation of true transit costs by the individual
wireless nodes can be called incentive compatible, following
mechanism design terminology. We can design an incentive
compatible broadcast protocol by prescribing an appropriate
allocation rule and payment rule into the broadcast protocol.
We shall refer to the problem of designing such robust broad-
cast protocols as the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB)
problem [11]. In this paper, we address the ICB problem in
ad hoc wireless networks and offer an elegant solution using
mechanism design theory.
B. Relevant Work
In the recent times, routing in the presence of selfish nodes
has received significant attention, driven by the need to design
protocols, like routing protocols, multi-cast protocols, etc., for
networks with selfish nodes.
The early research in cooperation of stimulation in ad
hoc wireless networks used a reputation mechanism [12].
These approaches use techniques such as auditing, use of
appropriate hardware, system-wide optimal point analysis to
identify selfish nodes and isolate non-cooperative nodes from
the network. The watchdog-mechanism in Marti, Giuli, Lai,
Baker [13], the core mechanism in Michiardi, and Molva [14],
the confidant mechanism in Buchegger, and Boudec [15], etc.
are a few examples of reputation mechanisms. These methods
look for a system-wide optimum point which may not be
individually optimal. Also, the use of hardware is not always
feasible in network settings.
Srinivasan, Nuggehalli, and Chiasserini [16] modeled the
routing situation using the repeated prisoner’s dilemma prob-
lem. According to evolutionary game theory, an effective
strategy in this kind of setting is the so-called TIT-FOR-TAT
strategy. In Altman, Kherani, Michiardi and Molva [17], each
node is assumed to forward packets with some probability
which is independent of the source. These models do not
take the dynamics of the network into consideration. A
game theoretic model was introduced by Urpi, Bonuccelli
and Giordano [18] based on static Bayesian games [1] to
model forwarding behavior of selfish nodes in ad hoc wireless
networks. Although this model properly formulates the game
that the nodes are playing, it does not allow non-simultaneous
decision making. In addition, the strategies in this framework
are not dependent on past behavior. To get around these
problems, Nurmi [19] modeled routing in ad hoc wireless
networks with selfish nodes as a dynamic Bayesian game.
This model is rich in the sense that it allows non-simultaneous
decision making and incorporating history information into the
decision making process.
Another important approach to designing incentive mecha-
nisms is based on the techniques of microeconomics. Mecha-
nism design is a powerful tool to model such situations. There
have been several efforts to design incentive mechanisms
for routing in ad hoc wireless networks in the presence of
selfish nodes. Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker
[20] and Hershberger and Suri [21] developed an incentive
mechanism to address the truthful low cost routing (unicast)
problem. The model consists of n nodes where each node
represents an autonomous system. They assume that each node
k incurs a transit cost ck for forwarding one transit packet.
For any pair of nodes i and j of the network, Ti,j is the total
amount of traffic originating from i and destined for node
j. The payments to nodes are computed using the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) payment rules [22], [23]. The authors
in [20] and [21] presented a distributed method such that each
node i can compute its payment pli,j to node l for carrying the
transit traffic from node i to node j if node l is on the least
cost path from i to j.
A similar type of model was presented by Anderegg and
Eidenbenz [9] for stimulating cooperation among selfish nodes
in ad hoc networks using an incentive scheme. This model
generalizes one aspect of [20] by associating several costs to
each node, one per each neighbor, instead of just one. This
leads to a model based on edge weighted graph representation
of the ad hoc network. The VCG mechanism is used to
compute a power efficient path, where each node determines
the power level required to transit/forward the packets. A node
by itself cannot determine its power level required because it
needs feedback information in the form of packets from its
neighbors. As the nodes are selfish and non-cooperative, this
feedback information may allow a node to cheat its neighbors
in order to raise its own payoff. The authors of [9] did not
address this issue. Eidenbenz, Santi, and Resta [24] modified
the model in Anderegg and Eidenbenz [9] by using the VCG
mechanism to compute the payments to the nodes, but the
sender is charged the total declared cost of a second least
cost path, that is the least cost path with all nodes in the cost
efficient path removed. This requires the existence of at least
two node disjoint paths between the sender and the receiver.
Wang and Li [25] proposed strategy-proof mechanisms for
the truthful unicast problem. They also presented an algorithm
for fast computation of payments to nodes and a distributed
algorithm for payment computation.
Zhong, Li, Liu, and Yang [26] used a two-stage routing pro-
tocol to model the routing problem in ad hoc wireless networks
with selfish nodes. They integrated a novel cryptographic
technique into the VCG mechanism to solve the link cost
dependence problem. Zhong, Chen, and Yang [27] proposed a
system called Sprite, which combines incentive methods and
cryptography techniques to implement a group cheat-proof ad
hoc routing system. Lu, Li, Wu [28] embed an incentive-
compatible, efficient, and individual rational payment scheme
into the routing protocol in ad hoc networks which consist
3of selfish nodes. Unlike traditional routing protocols in ad
hoc networks, which only elicit cost information from selfish
nodes, this model motivates selfish nodes to report truthfully
both their stability and cost information.
In all the above solution approaches for the incentive
compatible unicast problem (also known as the truthful unicast
problem), the intermediate nodes on the path between the
source node and the destination node are compensated for
forwarding the packet. Let us apply this technique of service
reimbursement to the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB)
problem and see the consequences. Consider a portion of
the network as shown in Figure 1. Let us consider node 1
to be the source of broadcast. Nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the
intended destinations of the broadcast packet. Node 5 needs
to reimburse the nodes 2, 3, and 4, since these nodes are
intermediate nodes on the path between node 1 and node 5
and they forward the broadcast packet. For similar reasons,
node 4 needs to reimburse the nodes 2 and 3 and node 3
needs to reimburse node 2. On the whole, node 2 receives
payments from nodes 3, 4, and 5 for forwarding a packet once.
Similarly, node 3 receives payments from node 4, and node 5.
Hence we end up with high values of over payments leading
to an inefficient solution to the ICB problem. It is important
to observe, in the context of broadcast, that all the nodes in
the network are intended destinations and there is no concept
of intermediate nodes as in the case of unicast.
Fig. 1. Relating incentive compatible unicast solution to the ICB problem
Wang and Li [29], [10] have proposed strategy-proof mech-
anisms for the truthful multicast problem in ad hoc wireless
networks with selfish nodes. The authors, in this model,
assume that the nodes in the multicast set forward the packets
for free among themselves. However, this assumption may not
be credible in real world applications, especially when the
nodes are rational. In our work, we assume that nodes, being
rational, do not necessarily forward the broadcast packets for
free. This assumption clearly captures the real-world more
accurately.
Suri and Narahari [30], [31] proposed a dominant strategy
incentive compatible mechanism, DSIC-B, that is built into
the corresponding broadcast protocol, as a solution to the ICB
problem. In the DSIC-B protocol, a node pays only for the
node from which it has received the broadcast packet and these
payments are designed such that the mechanism is truthful in
the dominant strategy sense, that is, true cost revelation is
a best response for each node irrespective of what the other
nodes report. There are, however, two limitations of using the
DSIC-B protocol [30], [31].
• (L1): The underlying graph of ad hoc wireless network
must be bi-connected.
• (L2): The DSIC-B protocol is not budget balanced [22],
[32].
The limitation (L1) implies that the DSIC-B protocol works
only for networks where the underlying graph of that network
is bi-connected. This means that there cannot exist any cut
vertex in the underlying graph. As the number of nodes in
the network increases, sustaining this condition is difficult.
The limitation (L2) implies that certain external budget needs
to be injected into the network to sustain the running of the
protocol.
To summarize the relevant work,
• Several game theoretic models and mechanism design
solutions have been proposed in the context of routing
and other functions in ad hoc networks. However, most
of these address only unicast and multicast.
• The mechanism design solutions proposed in the liter-
ature are all based on the VCG mechanisms. Though
the VCG mechanisms guarantee the extremely desirable
property of dominant strategy incentive compatibility, the
incentive budgets required tend to be very high. In fact,
there is a recent study [33] on the limitations of VCG
mechanisms (i.e. dominant strategy incentive compatible
mechanisms) in the design of protocols for networks with
selfish nodes.
• There are not too may studies in the literature which
address the incentive compatible broadcast problem. Also
the existing approaches for incentive compatible broad-
cast have many limitations. Further, the existing solutions
available for unicast and multicast invariably lead to
inefficient solutions when applied to the broadcast setting.
Till this point, we have set the stage for the need of design-
ing efficient incentive based mechanisms for ICB problem.
We propose to use Bayesian model to design such incentive
mechanisms. In the following section, we argue in the favor
of choosing a Bayesian model with which we can overcome
several limitations due to VCG based mechanisms.
C. Need for a Bayesian Model
There are several reasons why the Bayesian model makes
more sense than a VCG type of model:
• The payments in the VCG model are almost always much
higher when compared with the Bayesian models (This is
natural because the dominant strategy incentive compati-
bility property guaranteed by the VCG model is a much
stronger property and hence entails higher incentives to
be paid). This is well known in the mechanism design
literature.
• In the case of the Bayesian model, budget balance is
satisfied. On the other hand, in the case of the VCG
model, budget balance is difficult to achieve, except
under very special settings. Budget balance is a desirable
property because it ensures that the protocol does not
require any external source of funding and therefore is
self-sustaining.
• In the case of broadcast, the context is such that there is
one source node and the rest of the nodes are receivers of
the broadcast packet. Since the nodes are rational, they
4may need to make payments to receive the broadcast
packet(s). It makes sense to expect all the nodes that
receive packets to make the same payments. This is
because the source node has no way of distinguishing
among the remaining nodes (which are all receivers). We
have shown in this paper that the payments as computed
by the Bayesian model will be identical for all the
receiving nodes. Thus the Bayesian model captures the
real-world in a natural way.
However, there are two issues with the use of Bayesian ap-
proach. First, due to the high payments entailed by VCG-based
solutions, there is a compelling need to look for Bayesian
incentive compatibility, which is a much weaker form of
incentive compatibility. Second, we may lose out on individual
rationality. We have however derived a sufficient condition
under which individual rationality is also guaranteed by our
Bayesian model.
D. Contributions and Outline of the Paper
Motivated by the above considerations, we offer the follow-
ing contributions in this paper.
• We propose an incentive based broadcast mechanism that
satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes
the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes.
Bayesian incentive compatibility ensures that truth reve-
lation is a best response for each node whenever all other
nodes are also truthful.
• The above proposed mechanism, which we call BIC-B
(Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) mechanism,
also satisfies budget balance. This ensures that the pro-
tocol is self-sustaining and does not require any external
budget for sustaining the running of the protocol.
• We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the
ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B mechanism.
Individual rationality guarantees that the nodes do not
incur negative payoffs by participating in the protocol.
• We present an approach for a protocol implementation
based on the BIC-B mechanism. We also explain how
the payments to the nodes are computed following the
proposed mechanism.
• We show that the BIC-B protocol exhibits superior perfor-
mance in comparison to existing protocols for incentive
compatible broadcast such as DSIC-B.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present a game theoretic model for the incentive compatible
broadcast problem and offer a Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanism design solution for the problem. In Section III, we
investigate different properties of the proposed BIC-B protocol
such as budget balance, budget minimization, and individual
rationality. In Section IV, we present a simulation experiment
to exhibit the superior performance of the BIC-B protocol.
Section V concludes the paper and outlines a few directions
for future work.
II. THE MODEL AND THE BIC-B PROTOCOL
An ad hoc wireless network, in this paper, is represented by
an undirected graph G = (N,E), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is
the set of n wireless nodes and E is the set of communication
links between the nodes. There exists a communication link
between two nodes i and j, if a node i is reachable from node
j, and node j is also reachable from node i. Thus we have
an undirected graph representation. We assume that wireless
nodes use directional antennas and a single transmission by a
node may be received by only a subset of nodes in its vicinity.
We note that all nodes in the graph G are connected.
We assume that the nodes in the ad hoc wireless network
are owned by rational and intelligent individuals and so
their objective is to maximize their individual goals. For this
reason, they may not always participate loyally in key network
functions, such as forwarding the packets, since such activity
might consume the node’s resources, such as battery power,
bandwidth, CPU cycles, etc. Let each node i incur a cost θi
for forwarding a packet. For simplicity, we assume that θi is
independent of the neighbor from which the packet is received
and the neighbor to which the packet is destined. We can
represent θi as the weight of node i in the graph G. This
implies that we work with a node weighted graph.
Consider the task of broadcast in such a setting. Assume that
the source of the broadcast is node s. Not all remaining nodes
may be connected to node s, hence appropriate intermediate
nodes have to forward the broadcast packet to ensure that
the packet reaches all the nodes in the network. As explained
above, the nodes that forward the packet(s) incur costs. This
means, we need to look at a tree that spans all the nodes and
has the source node s as the root of the tree. We call such a
tree as Source Rooted Broadcast Tree (SRBT). Given an SRBT,
we design an appropriate incentive scheme or mechanism that
is built into the broadcast protocol.
A. A Game Theoretic Model
A game theoretic model in the above setting is described
below.
• There are n wireless nodes, 1, 2, . . . , n in the ad hoc
network. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Each wireless node i privately observes a signal θi that
determines the cost for the node i to forward a packet.
The value of θi is known to agent i deterministically since
θi is dependent of the consumed CPU cycles, battery
power, bandwidth, etc. However this value is not known
to other nodes. Hence we call θi as the private value or
type of node i.
• We denote by Θi the set of types of node i, i =
1, 2, . . . , n. Θ = ×i∈NΘi is the set of all type profiles of
the nodes. θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) represents a typical type
profile of the nodes.
• It is assumed that the types of the nodes are drawn from
a common prior distribution ϕ. We make the standard
assumption that individual belief functions pi are com-
puted using the above common prior. The belief function
pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) describes the belief of node i about
the types of the remaining nodes.
• X is the set of different possible outcomes. Each outcome
specifies the set of routers and payments to those routers
for forwarding packets. The selection of a particular
5choice of set of routers depends on the type profile
θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) of the nodes. This is captured by
social choice function f(.) [22].
• If a node i forwards a packet, it incurs a cost θi and hence
it must be compensated appropriately. More generally, we
capture this notion by a utility function ui : X ×Θi →
R. In particular, we assume that the utility functions are
quasi-linear.
Following the terminology of mechanism design [22], a mech-
anism M = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn, g(.)) is a collection of strategy
sets S1, S2, . . . , Sn and an outcome function g(.). Here Si
captures the possible announcements of node i regarding
its incurred costs. The outcome function g(.) is defined as
g : S1 × S2 × . . .× Sn → X . A mechanism is a framework
which prescribes an action set for each player and specifies
how these action profiles are transformed into outcomes.
The outcome function g(.) gives the rule for obtaining out-
comes from action profiles. A mechanism induces a Bayesian
game (N, (Si), (Θi), (pi), (Ui)) where Ui(.) is computed from
ui(g(.), θi) [22]. This induced Bayesian game can have a
solution which is either a dominant strategy equilibrium or
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Accordingly we have either
a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism or a
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, respectively.
B. The BIC-B Protocol
We now present a mechanism that implements the so-
cial choice function (SCF) f(θ) = (k(θ), t1(θ), . . . , tn(θ)),
∀θ ∈ Θ. Here k(θ), and ti(θ), ∀i ∈ N are interpreted in
the following way. k(θ) is the allocation rule that represents
which nodes in the network have to forward the packet, given
the profile θ of types. The vector (t1(θ), . . . , tn(θ)) gives
payments received by the nodes, given the profile θ of types.
For any i ∈ N , if ti(θ) > 0, then the interpretation is that
i receives some positive amount and if ti(θ) < 0, then the
interpretation is that i pays some positive amount.
Assume that we are given the SRBT corresponding to the
graph under consideration. We design, based on the given
SRBT, an the following payment scheme that determines the
payments (ti(θ))i∈N to the individual nodes for a broadcast. In
the SRBT, all the internal nodes forward the broadcast packet.
We call such packet forwarding nodes as routers, and represent
the set of routers by R. Note that each outcome of the SCF
f(.) has an allocation rule and a payment rule. We define the
allocation rule in the following way: ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N ,
ki(θ) = 1, if i ∈ R
= 0, if i /∈ R
The valuation function, vi(k(θ), θi), of node i is its cost to
forward a transit packet. From the allocation rule k(.) in our
SCF f(.), we get, ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N ,
vi(k(θ), θi) = −θi, if i ∈ R (1)
= 0, if i /∈ R (2)
The broadcast packets from the source node travel through
the paths specified in the SRBT. To compensate the incurred
cost of the routers in the network, we need to determine pay-
ments to the nodes. We follow the payment rule of the classical
dAGVA mechanism or expected externality mechanism [22],
[34], to compute the payments to the nodes in our scheme.
Using the payment rule of the dAGVA mechanism [22], [34],
∀i ∈ N , ∀θ ∈ Θ, we get
ti(θ) = Eθ−i
[∑
l 6=i vl(k(θ), θl)
]
−
(
1
n−1
)∑
j 6=iEθ−j
[∑
l 6=j vl(k(θ), θl)
]
From (1), (2) we get, ∀i ∈ N , ∀θ ∈ Θ,
ti(θ) =
(
1
n− 1
)∑
j 6=i
Eθ−j
 ∑
l∈R, l 6=j
θl
−Eθ−i
 ∑
l∈R, l 6=i
θl

(3)
where Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
is interpreted as the total ex-
pected value to node i that would be generated by all the
remaining nodes in the absence of node i. This completes the
characterization of the payment rule of the BIC-B mechanism.
Note that this mechanism with the above payment rule is
incentive compatible. This directly follows from the incentive
compatibility property of the dAGVA mechanism [22], [34].
In the following, we first present an illustrative example to
understand the details of the proposed payment scheme and
we then investigate the properties of the mechanism.
C. An Example
Now we provide an example to illustrate the payment
scheme in BIC-B protocol. Let us consider the graph in
Figure 2, which is not bi-connected. We recall that the types
of nodes are their incurred transit costs. We consider the
type sets of nodes as Θ1 = {10, 11}, Θ2 = {15, 16},
Θ3 = {12, 13}, Θ4 = {7, 8}. Now let us assume that the
players belief probability functions are independent discrete
uniform distributions with equal probabilities for all types. and
θ = (10, 15, 13, 8) is the announced cost profile.
Fig. 2. Illustrative example 1
In this example, SRBT is also the same the original graph.
Now, the allocation rule is k(θ) = (0, 1, 1, 0). We note that
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and R = {2, 3}. The valuation functions
of nodes are, v1(k(θ)) = 0, v2(k(θ)) = −15, v3(k(θ)) =
−13, v4(k(θ)) = 0. Now we compute the payments using the
payment rule (3) of BIC-B protocol.
The payment computation for node 1:
6t1(θ) =
(
1
4−1
)∑
j 6=1Eθ−j
[∑
l∈R, l 6=j θl
]
−Eθ−1
[∑
l∈R, l 6=1 θl
]
=
(
1
3
)
Eθ−2
[∑
l∈R, l 6=2 θl
]
+
(
1
3
)
Eθ−3
[∑
l∈R, l 6=3 θl
]
+
(
1
3
)
Eθ−4
[∑
l∈R, l 6=4 θl
]
−Eθ−1
[∑
l∈R, l 6=1 θl
]
=
(
1
3
) [
Eθ−2 [θ3] + Eθ−3 [θ2] + Eθ−4 [θ2 + θ3]
]
−Eθ−1 [θ2 + θ3]
=
(
1
3
) [
Eθ−2 [θ3] + Eθ−3 [θ2]
]
+
(
1
3
) [
Eθ−4 [θ2] + Eθ−4 [θ3]
]
− [Eθ−1 [θ2] + Eθ−1 [θ3]]
(since types are statistically independent)
=
(
1
3
)
[12.5 + 15.5 + 15.5 + 12.5]
− [15.5 + 12.5]
= −9.33
In the similar fashion, we can compute the payments
to the remaining nodes also. The payments to nodes are:
t1(θ) = −9.3, t2(θ) = 11.3, t3(θ) =7.3, t4(θ) = −9.3. In
this example, node 1 and node 4 do not forward the packets.
Observe that they pay the same amount, namely 9.33. Since
node 2 and node 3 are routers, they receive amounts 11.33
and 7.33 respectively. Further observe that
∑4
i=1 ti(θ) = 0.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE BIC-B PROTOCOL
A. Budget Balance
Assume that ξi(θi) = Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
, ∀i ∈ N . To
show budget balance, we need to show that the sum of the
payments received and the payments made by the nodes in
the network is zero, i.e.
∑
i ti(θ) = 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θ. Let us
assume that ξi(θi) = Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
, ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N .
Then, from (3), we get ∀θ ∈ Θ
ti(θ) = ξi(θi)−
(
1
n− 1
)∑
j 6=i
ξj(θj)
then,
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) =
n∑
i=1
ξi(θi)−
(
1
n− 1
) n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
ξj(θj)
=
n∑
i=1
ξi(θi)−
(
1
n− 1
) n∑
i=1
(n− 1)ξj(θj)
⇒ ∑ni=1 ti(θ) = 0
It can be noted that each node i distributes ξi equally among
the remaining (n−1) nodes. Figure 3 shows this interpretation
for a graph with 3 nodes.
Let us represent the flow into the node with positive sign
and the flow going out from the node by negative sign. Now
the payment, t1(θ), for node 1 can be written as
t1(θ1, θ2, θ3) = 12ξ2(θ2) +
1
2ξ3(θ3)− ξ1(θ1)
Similarly, we can write down the payments to the remaining
two nodes.
Fig. 3. An interpretation of the payment rule
B. Payments by Non-Router Nodes
Recall that N is the set of nodes and R represents the set
of routers in the network. We now state Lemma 1 which is
useful in proving Lemma 2 and subsequently Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: For any i ∈ R and for any j /∈ R, we have
Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
= Eθ−j
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
.
Proof: Proof is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 2: For the BIC-B protocol, ti(θ) < 0, ∀i /∈ R, ∀θ ∈
Θ. That is, the nodes other than the routers will pay a positive
amount of money for receiving the packet(s).
Proof: If R is empty, then the source node can reach all the
remaining nodes in the network within a single hop. In that
case, the payments will be 0. We are not interested in such a
trivial situation. So we assume that,
|R| > 0 (4)
Let us assume that, ∀j /∈ R,
Γj = Eθ−j
[∑
l∈R, l 6=j θl
]
= Eθ−j
[∑
l∈R θl
]
(since j /∈ R)
Since the types of nodes are statistically independent, the
values of Γj , ∀j /∈ R, are all the same. We represent this
value with Γ. That is,
Γ = Γj , ∀j /∈ R. (5)
Now, let us assume that Υi = Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
, ∀i ∈ R.
Then
Υi = Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
= Eθ−j
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
(consequence of Lemma 1)
< Eθ−j
[∑
l∈R θl
]
(since i ∈ R)
= Γ (from equation (5))
So, we can conclude that
Υi < Γ, ∀i ∈ R. (6)
7From the payment rule (3) of the BIC-B protocol, we have
∀i /∈ R,
ti(θ) =
(
1
n−1
)∑
j 6=i, j∈N Eθ−j
[∑
l∈R, l 6=j θl
]
−Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
=
(
1
n−1
)∑
j∈REθ−j
[∑
l∈R, l 6=j θl
]
+
(
1
n−1
)∑
j 6=i, j /∈REθ−j
[∑
l∈R, l 6=j θl
]
−Eθ−i
[∑
l∈R, l 6=i θl
]
=
(
1
n−1
)∑
j∈R Υj +
((
1
n−1
)∑
j 6=i, j /∈R Γ
)
− Γ
(since from equation (5))
=
(
1
n−1
)∑
j∈R Υj +
(
|N |−|R|−1
n−1 − 1
)
Γ
=
(
1
n−1
)∑
j∈R Υj −
(
1
n−1
)∑
j∈R Γ
=
(
1
n−1
)∑
j∈R(Υj − Γ)
< 0, (from (6)).
According to our previous interpretation, ti(θ) < 0 means
that node i needs to pay the specified amount. This completes
the proof the lemma. (Q.E.D.).
Observation 1: From the proof of Lemma 2, we know that
∀i /∈ R,
ti(θ) =
(
1
n−1
)∑
j∈R(Υj − Γ)
Note that the right hand side of the above expression is
independent from i. Hence, using the BIC-B protocol, ti(.),
∀i /∈ R are all the same. The immediate implication is that
the payments made by the nodes other than the routers are the
same.
C. Optimality of the BIC-B Payments
Here we prove the optimality of the payments prescribed by
the BIC-B protocol. We note that an appropriate allocation rule
is employed to determine the SRBT of the underlying graph of
the ad hoc wireless network for the broadcast task. We define
cost of SRBT is sum of the forwarding costs of the router
nodes. It is the case that any allocation rule tries to minimize
the cost of the SRBT. If it is hard to find optimal SRBT,
then we assume that an appropriate approximation algorithm
is used to determine the SRBT.
We make the following observation for the sake of Theorem
1.
Observation 2: Consider two type profiles θ and θ
′
. Assume
that these two types are different only with respect to the type
of node i. Using the BIC-B mechanism, when the types are θ
and θ
′
, the payments to node i are ti(θ) and ti(θ
′
) respectively.
Note that if the corresponding SRBT is the same for both the
types θ and θ
′
, then the set of routers is the same and hence the
payments ti(θ) and ti(θ
′
) respectively to node i are the same.
This is because in the payment rule (3) of BIC-B mechanism,
the quantities involved only look for expected values of the
types of the routers.
Theorem 1: For the given SRBT structure of the underlying
graph G of the ad hoc wireless network, the payment to any
node using the BIC-B mechanism is minimum among all other
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms based on SRBT .
Proof: We provide a contradiction to prove the statement. Let
t(.) be the payment rule of the BIC-B mechanism based on
the given SRBT. Assume that there exists another Bayesian
incentive compatible mechanism with payment rule tˆ(·) such
that the payment to a router node i is strictly less. That is,
tˆi(θ) < ti(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ, for some i ∈ N (7)
We construct a contradiction to show that tˆ(·) is not incen-
tive compatible for the node i under some cost profile θ
′
. We
construct θ
′
from θ by replacing the cost θi of node i with
(ti(θ) + ), where  > 0. That is, if the cost profile θ is such
that θ = (θi, θ−i), (where the n-tuple (θi, θ−i) indicates a
cost profile of the nodes where the cost of node i is θi and the
costs of remaining nodes is represented by θ−i), then the cost
profile θ
′
is such that θ
′
= ((ti(θ) + ), θ−i). Recall that node
i is a router in the corresponding SRBT when type profile is
θ. We now consider the following two cases.
Case 1: Consider θ
′
is the announced cost profile. Assume
that node i is a router in the corresponding SRBT. This
assumption is true definitely if (ti(θ) + ) < θi because
node i is a router even with the type θi. That is, the SRBT
is one and the same under both the type profiles θ and
θ
′
. Using the payment rule tˆ(.), the payment to node i is
tˆi(θ
′
). Now the gain from being a router to the node i is
tˆi(θ
′
)− (ti(θ) + ) < ti(θ′)− (ti(θ) + ) = − < 0 (using (7)
and Observation 2).
Case 2: Consider θ
′
is the announced cost profile. Assume
that node i is not a router in the appropriate SRBT. Then
there is no forwarding cost incurred to node i. Then there is
no issue.
Hence for node i, if its type is (ti(θ) + ) < θi and then it
happens to be a router in the corresponding SRBT and it gets
negative gains. Due to the appropriate arguments in Theorem
2, there exists a θi ∈ Θi such that (ti(θ) + ) < θi is true.
Hence the mechanism with tˆ(·) as the payment rule is not
incentive compatible. This provides the required contradiction.
(Q.E.D.).
D. Individual Rationality of the BIC-B Protocol
We now investigate the individual rationality (IR) of the
BIC-B protocol. In particular, we investigate the ex post
individual rationality, which is the strongest among the three
notions of individual rationality [22], [32]. In the following
theorem, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for
the ex post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. Let
θˆi be the announced cost of a node i and θi be the actual cost
of that node.
Theorem 2: The BIC-B protocol is ex post individual rational
if and only if
θˆi ≤ ( nn−1 )E[θi], ∀i ∈ R
where the θˆi is the announced cost of the node i.
Proof: See Appendix.
8E. An Implementation of the BIC-B Protocol
In the previous sections, we have designed the BIC-B
mechanism for providing incentives to the nodes to participate
in the broadcast task. We have also proved certain important
properties of the mechanism. Here we provide a protocol
implementation for the BIC-B mechanism.
The protocol implementation is motivated by the emerging
technology of hybrid ad hoc wireless networks, where there
are base stations that provide fixed infrastructure for many
network related functions. We propose that additional func-
tionality (which we call mediation functionality) as described
below be incorporated into each base station. Let us call this
part of the base station as the mediator. The mediator could
be a part of any other network infrastructure also.
The mediator elicits the types from all the nodes, computes
the allocation and payments of the nodes, and announces the
outcome. We assume that all the nodes can communicate with
the mediator.
After receiving the messages from the mediator regarding
the payments, each node constructs an internal table as shown
in Table I. Each row of the table corresponds to a node in
the network. Each row contains three fields of information:
(a) Source ID, which specifies the source node ID from which
the packet is originating, (b) Node List, which specifies the set
of nodes to which the packet needs to be forwarded, and (c)
Payment, which specifies the payment to be received or paid.
The following is the structure of internal table of a node:
Source ID Node List Payment
TABLE I
STRUCTURE OF INTERNAL TABLE OF A NODE
In view of the above, the BIC-B protocol can be imple-
mented as follows.
BIC-B Protocol: If a node receives a broadcast packet, it
checks its internal table entry corresponding to the source ID
of the broadcast. Then it forwards the packet to the set of nodes
specified in the Node List field of the entry and receives the
payment as mentioned in the Payment field of the entry. On
the other hand, if the Node List field is empty, then the node
does not forward the packet to any node and makes a payment
as mentioned in the Payment field of the entry.
In the above protocol, all the payment information by the
node is communicated directly to the mediator which takes
care of all the book keeping.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE BIC-B PROTOCOL
In this section, we show the efficacy of the proposed BIC-B
protocol for the ICB problem. In our simulation experiments,
we compare the performance of the BIC-B protocol with
that of the Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast
(DSIC-B) protocol [11], [30].
A. Simulation Model
The DSIC-B protocol is based on dominant strategy equi-
librium of the underlying game and the BIC-B protocol is
based on the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the underlying
game. Since every dominant strategy equilibrium is also a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, but not vice-versa, we first find
a dominant strategy equilibrium of the underlying game and
compute the payments to the nodes using the DSIC-B and the
BIC-B protocols [11].
We work with a randomly generated graph of an ad
hoc wireless network with the number of nodes n =
5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. According to our network
model presented in Section II, the graph is node weighted
where these weights are the transit costs of the nodes chosen
independently and uniformly from a range [1, 50]. After the
nodes announce their types, we first compute the least cost
paths to all the nodes from the source node and then construct
an SRBT. Using the SRBT, we can decide the set of routers.
This fixes the allocation rule. Then we compute payments to
the nodes using the payment rule of the appropriate broadcast
protocol. In all our simulation experiments, the results for
the performance metrics are averages taken over 100 random
instances.
B. Simulation Results
We consider two performance metrics. The first metric is
average payment to routers (APR). This specifies the payment
on an average to each router for forwarding the transit packets.
The graph in Figure 4 shows the comparison of the BIC-B
protocol and the DSIC-B protocol using APR. In the figure, the
lower curve corresponds to the BIC-B protocol. It is clear from
the figure that the BIC-B protocol performs better than the
DSIC-B protocol. This means that the system wide payments
made by the nodes to forward a broadcast packet is less using
the BIC-B protocol.
Fig. 4. Average payment to routers in the DSIC-B and BIC-B protocols
The second performance metric, we follow, is the worst
overpayment ratio (WOR). We first define overpayment ratio
9as the ratio of payment made by a node to its least cost path
value from the source node s. Now, we can define WOR as
the maximum over the overpayment ratios of all the nodes in
the network. That is,
WOR = maxi∈N payment made by node icost of path from source of broadcast to node i
where cost of path from source of broadcast to node i is the
sum of forwarding costs of the nodes that lie on the path from
the source of broadcast node to the node i. Ideally we expect
this ratio to be 1. We compare the WOR of BIC-B protocol
and the DSIC-B protocol in Figure 5. We note that the lower
curve corresponds to the BIC-B protocol in the figure. From
the graph, it is easy to see that the worst overpayment ratio in
the network is higher using the DSIC-B protocol than BIC-B
protocol. WOR conveys the following significant information.
When a node receives a packet from a router, then clearly the
payment made by the receiver node to the router is higher than
the value of its least cost path, since it has to give incentives
to the router to make it reveal the true incurred cost. If we take
a ratio of the payment to the value of least cost path, from
the Figure 5, this ratio is less than 2 times over all the nodes
using the BIC-B protocol and it is higher than 5 times over
all the nodes using the DSIC-B protocol. This says that nodes
end up with very high payments, using DSIC-B protocol, than
actually what their value of the corresponding least cost path.
Fig. 5. Worst overpayment ratios for the DSIC-B and BIC-B protocols
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB)
problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We
proposed an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies
Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive
budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed pro-
tocol, BIC-B, also satisfies budget balance. We also derived a
necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual
rationality of the BIC-B protocol. We showed that the BIC-
B protocol exhibits superior performance when compared
to a dominant strategy incentive compatible solution to the
problem. Thus in this paper, we have addressed the ICB
problem by proposing an incentive mechanism and design of
the BIC-B protocol.
While designing incentive based protocols, we note that the
complete solution includes (a) design of the incentive mecha-
nism (b) design of a protocol which implements the incentive
mechanism and (c) addressing any problems that may arise,
such as the cheating problem. Our main contribution in this
paper is in designing an incentive mechanism. We have also
briefly addressed the design of a protocol in the current version
of the paper. To address the cheating, we need to invoke
cryptographic techniques. There is some literature available on
the use of cryptographic techniques to implement protocols,
for example [35].
In terms of mechanism design, it would be interesting
to explore optimal broadcast mechanisms in the Myerson
sense [22], [34]. These are mechanisms that minimize the
incentive budgets subject to Bayesian incentive compatibility
and individual rationality.
An important problem that could be explored is design
of Bayesian incentive compatible protocols for unicast and
multicast problems. Existing game theoretic approaches to
unicast and multicast are all based on VCG mechanisms and
have the usual limitations associated with the use of VCG
mechanisms.
Also, it is important to address certain practical issues that
arise in the implementation of these mechanisms as part of
standard protocols. For example, the payment computation is
performed in a centralized way in the BIC-B protocol. It would
be interesting to design a distributed algorithm for this problem
that could help deploy the BIC-B protocol in the real world.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research in this paper is partially supported by a re-
search on Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Complex Game
Theoretic Problems funded by the Office of Naval Research
(Grant No. N0014-06-1-0994), Arlington, VA, USA. We wish
to thank Dr Shantanu Das, Program Manager, Communica-
tions and Networking, for the encouragement and support.
REFERENCES
[1] R. B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997.
[2] V. Srivastava, J. Neel, A.B. MacKenzie, R. Menon, L.A. DaSilva,
J. Hicks, J.H. Reed, and R. Gilles, “Using game theory to analyze
wireless ad hoc networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutori-
als, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 46–56, 2005.
[3] I. Zaikiuddin, T. Hawkins, and N. Moffat, “Towards a game-theoretic
understanding of ad-hoc routing,” in Proceedings of Workshop on Games
in Design and Verification (GDV), 2004, pp. 67–92.
[4] Q. Chen and Z. Niu, “A game-theoretical power and rate control for
wireless ad hoc networks with step-up price,” IEICE Transactions on
Communications, vol. E88-B, no. 9, pp. 3515–3523, 2005.
[5] C. Saraydar, N. Mandayam, and D. Goodman, “Nash equilibria of packet
forwarding strategies in wireless ad hoc networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Communications, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 291–303, 2002.
[6] P. Kyasanur and N.H. Vaidya, “Selfish MAC layer misbehavior in
wireless networks,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 4,
no. 5, pp. 502–516, 2004.
[7] Z. Fang and B. Bensaou, “Fair bandwidth sharing algorithms based on
game theory frameworks for wireless ad-hoc networks,” in Proceedings
of the 23rd IEEE Conference on Computer and Communications,
(INFOCOM), 2004, pp. 1284–1295.
10
[8] B. Lu and U.W. Pooch, “A game theoretic framework for band-
width reservation in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the
1st International Conference on Quality of Service in Heterogeneous
Wired/Wireless Networks (QSHINE04), 2004.
[9] L. Anderegg and S. Eidenbenz, “Ad hoc-VCG: A truthful and cost-
efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish
agents,” in Proceedings of the 9th Annual ACM International Conference
on Mobile Computing and Networking (MOBICOM), 2003, pp. 245–259.
[10] W. Wang and X.Y. Li, “Low-cost truthful multicast in selfish and rational
wireless ad hoc networks,” in Proceeding of the 1st IEEE International
Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS), 2004.
[11] N. Rama Suri, “Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless
ad hoc networks: A Game theoretic approch,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE INFOCOM 2006 Student’s Workshop, Barcelona, 2006.
[12] P. Resnick, R. Zeckhauser, E. Friedman, and K. Kuwabara, “Reputation
systems: Facilitating trust in internet interactions,” Communications of
the ACM, vol. 43, no. 12, pp. 45–48, 2000.
[13] S. Marti, T.J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating routing
misbehaviour in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the
6th Annual ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and
Networking (MOBICOM), 2000, pp. 255–265.
[14] P. Michiardi and R. Molva, “Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism
to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings
of the 6th Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia
Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security, Kluwar,
2002, pp. 107–121.
[15] S. Buchegger and J.-Y.L. Boudec, “Performance analysis of the
confidant protocol: Cooperation of nodes - fairness in dynamic ad hoc
networks,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Symposium on
Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, 2002, pp. 226–236.
[16] V. Srinivasan, P. Nuggehalli, F. Chiasserini, and R.R. Rao, “Cooperation
in wireless ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE
Conference on Computer and Communications, (INFOCOM), 2003, pp.
808–817.
[17] E. Altman, A.A. Kherani, P. Michiardi, and R. Molva, “Non-cooperative
forwarding in ad-hoc networks,” Tech. Rep., INRIA, Sophin Antipolis,
France, 2004.
[18] A. Urpi, M. Bonuccelli, and S. Giordano, “Modeling cooperation
in mobile ad hoc networks: a formal description of selfishness,” in
Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Modeling and Optimiztion in
Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, 2003.
[19] P. Nurmi, “Modelling routing in wireless ad hoc networks with dynamic
bayesian games,” in Proceedings of 1st IEEE Conference on Sensor,
Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON), 2004, pp.
63–70.
[20] J. Feigenbaum, C. Papadimitriou, R. Sami, and S. Shenker, “A BGP-
based mechanism for lowest-cost routing,” in Proceedings of the 21st
ACM Symposium on Principles Of Distributed Computing (PODC),
2002, pp. 173–182.
[21] J. Hershberge and S. Suri, “Vickrey prices and shortest paths: What
is an edge worth?,” in Proceedings of the 42th IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001, pp. 252–259.
[22] A.S. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green, Microeconomic
Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
[23] D. Garg and Y. Narahari, “Foundations of mechanism design,” Tech.
Rep., Dept. of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of
Science, Bangalore, India, 2006.
[24] S. Eidenbenz, P. Santi, and G. Resta, “COMMIT: A sendercentric
truthful and energy-efficient routing protocol for ad hoc networks,” in
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Wireless, Mobile, and Ad
Hoc Networks (WMAN) in conjunction with 19th IEEE International
Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS), 2005.
[25] W. Wang and X.Y. Li, “Truthful low-cost unicast in selfish wireless
networks,” in Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on
Algorithms for Wireless, Mobile, Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (WMAN)
of IPDPS, 2004.
[26] S. Zhong, L.E. Li, Y.G. Liu, and Y.R. Yang, “On designing incentive-
compatible routing and forwarding protocols in wireless ad-hoc net-
works: an integrated approach using game theoretical and cryptographic
techniques,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM annual international
conference on Mobile computing and networking (MobiCom), 2005, pp.
117–131.
[27] S. Zhong, J. Chen, and Y. Yang, “Sprite: A simple, cheatproof, credit-
based system for mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the 22nd
IEEE Conference on Computer and Communications, (INFOCOM),
2003.
[28] M. Lu, F. Li, and J. Wu, “Incentive compatible cost- and stability-based
routing in ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS), 2006, pp.
495–500.
[29] W. Wang, X.Y. Li, and Y. Wang, “Truthful multicast in selfish wireless
networks,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM annual international
conference on Mobile computing and networking (MobiCom), 2004, pp.
245–259.
[30] N. Rama Suri and Y. Narahari, “Design of incentive compatible
protocols for ad hoc wireless networks,” Tech. Rep., Dept. of CSA,
IISc, Bangalore., 2007.
[31] N. Rama Suri and Y. Narahari, “Broadcast in ad hoc wireless networks
with selfish nodes: A bayesian incentive compatibility approach,” in 2nd
IEEE/Create-Net/ICST International Conference on COMmunication
System softWAre and MiddlewaRE (COMSWARE), 2007.
[32] D. Garg, Design of Innovative Mechanisms for Contemporary Game
Theoretic Problems in Electronic Commerce, Ph.D. thesis, Dept. of
CSA, Indian Institute of Science, June, 2006.
[33] P. Maille and B. Tuffin, “Why VCG auctions can hardly be applied to the
pricing of inter-domain and ad hoc networks,” Tech. Rep., GET/ENST
Bretagne, France, 2006.
[34] D. Garg, Y. Narahari, and S. Gujar, “Foundations of mech-
anism design: Part 1 - fundamental concepts and key results,”
Sadhana, Indian academy Proceedings in Engineering Sciences
(http://lcm.csa.iisc.ernet.in/gametheory/md1-dec07.pdf), 2008.
[35] S. Zhong, L.E. Li, Y.R. Yang, and Y. Liu, “On designing incentive-
compatible routing and forwarding protocols in wireless ad-hoc networks
— an integrated approach using game theoretical and cryptographic
techniques,” ACM/Baltzer Wireless Networks (WINET), 2006.
N. Rama Suri received M.Sc.(Engg.) degree in
computer science, in 2006, from the Indian Institute
of Science, Bangalore, India. He is currently a Ph.D.
scholar in Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,
India. His current research interests include game
theory, mechanism design, ad hoc wireless networks,
social networks, electronic commerce, WWW. He is
recipient of Microsoft Research India Ph.D. fellow-
ship for the duration 2007-2011.
Dr. Y. Narahari is currently a Professor at the
Department of Computer Science and Automation,
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. He completed
his Ph.D. at the same Department in 1988, with his
Doctoral Dissertation on Petri Nets winning the Best
Thesis Award for Electrical Sciences at the Indian
Institute of Science. His current research focuses
on the use of game theory and mechanism design
in network economics problems. He is currently
completing a research monograph entitled Emerging
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics
and Mechanism Design Solutions, to be published by Springer, London. He
has spent sabbaticals at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass, USA, in 1992 and at the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, MD, USA, in 1997. He is currently on the editorial board
of IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man & Cybernetics (Part A) and IEEE
Transactions on Automation Science & Engineering (where he is a Senior
Editor). Dr. Narahari is a Fellow of the IEEE, a fellow of the Indian
National Academy of Engineering, a fellow of the Indian National Academy
of Sciences, and a Homi Bhabha Research Fellow. He has been involved in
several high impact collaborative research projects with General Motors R &
D, Intel, and Infosys Technologies.
11
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Note that the types of the nodes are statistically independent
according to the current network model. For this reason, it does not
matter even though we take the expectation, in the above expression,
with respect to θi or θj , where i ∈ R and j /∈ R. Now it is easy to
prove the lemma. Let the nodes in the set R be indexed by the set
{1, 2, ..., r}, where r = |R|. Now for any j /∈ R and i ∈ R,
Eθ−j
hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
=
R
...
R hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
q(x1)...q(xj−1)q(xj+1)...q(xn)
d(x1)...d(xj−1)d(xj+1)...d(xn)
=
R
...
R hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
q(x1)...q(xr) d(x1)...d(xr)
(since types are statistically independent)
=
R
...
R hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
q(x1)...q(xi−1)q(xi+1)...q(xr)
d(x1)...d(xi−1)d(xi+1)...d(xr)
(since
hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
does not include θi)
=
R
...
R hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
q(x1)...q(xi−1)q(xi+1)...q(xn)
d(x1)...d(xi−1)d(xi+1)...d(xn)
(since types are statistically independent)
= Eθ−i
hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We show that the utility of each router is non-negative after
participating in the mechanism if and only if the specified condition
holds. This is nothing but proving the ex post individual rationality
of the nodes.
Let f be the mechanism for the ICB problem. Now for ex post
individual rationality to hold for the router nodes,
ui(f(θˆ), θˆi) ≥ 0, ∀θˆ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ R.
where θˆ is the vector of announcements of the costs (or types) of the
nodes. We also call θˆ as the announced cost (or type) profile of the
nodes.
Now we characterize the utility of each node i ∈ R. All nodes are
the intended recipients of the packet(s) in a broadcast in the network.
We know, from Observation 1, that the payment made by a non-router
node is equivalent to tm(θˆ) for any m /∈ R. Since the routers are also
intended recipients, they also need to pay this amount. But, actually
the routers do not pay this amount and hence it is credited to their
utility. Now we have, ∀θˆ ∈ Θ,
ui(f(θˆ), θˆi) = vi(k(θˆi, θˆ−i))− tm(θˆ) + ti(θˆ) (8)
We have tm(θˆ) < 0 for any m /∈ R, from Lemma 2. Hence this term
appears with negative sign in the expression (8). Now substituting the
expression (3) in (8) and rearranging the terms, we get ∀θˆ ∈ Θ,
ui(f(θˆ), θˆi) = −θˆi + Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜ −Eθ−i hPl∈R, l6=i θli
+
“
1
n−1
”P
j 6=iEθ−j
hP
l∈R, l6=j θl
i
−
“
1
n−1
”P
j 6=mEθ−j
hP
l∈R, l6=j θl
i
By canceling out appropriate the terms, we get ∀θˆ ∈ Θ,
ui(f(θˆ), θˆi) = −θˆi + Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜ −Eθ−i hPl∈R, l6=i θli
+
“
1
n−1
”
Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜
−
“
1
n−1
”
Eθ−i
hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
= −θˆi + Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜ −Eθ−m hPl∈R, l6=i θli
+
“
1
n−1
”
Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜
−
“
1
n−1
”
Eθ−m
hP
l∈R, l6=i θl
i
(consequence of Lemma 1)
= −θˆi + Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜ −Eθ−m ˆPl∈R θl˜
+Eθ−m [θi] +
“
1
n−1
”
Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜
−
“
1
n−1
”
Eθ−m
ˆP
l∈R θl
˜
+
“
1
n−1
”
Eθ−m [θi]
(by expanding the Expectation terms)
= −θˆi + E[θi] +
“
1
n−1
”
E[θi]
= nE[θi]−(n−1)θˆi
n−1
For the BIC-B protocol to be ex post individually rational,
ui(f(θˆ), θˆi) ≥ 0, ∀θˆ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ R
From the above characterization of utility function, we get
nE[θi]−(n−1)θˆi
n−1 ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ R
This implies,
θˆi ≤ ( nn−1 )E[θi], ∀i ∈ R.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that each of above arguments are
reversible and hence the specified condition is necessary and sufficient
for BIC-B protocol to satisfy ex post individual rationality.
Q.E.D.
